China has prioritized energy collaboration during the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meetings in Tianjin. President Xi Jinping revealed China’s plan to invest in developing 10 gigawatts (GW) of solar power and 10 GW of wind energy within SCO member countries over the next five years.
This marks a significant boost from the 1 GW of solar and 0.3 GW of wind energy China has invested in SCO nations since 2019. Additionally, there was implied support for the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, which, if constructed, could raise Russia’s share of China’s gas imports to about one-third by the 2030s.
How will China’s energy investments impact the energy transformation efforts of SCO member states? Does China’s cooperation with Central Asian nations and energy powerhouse Russia hint at a major shift in the global energy scene? Researchers from China, India, Pakistan, and Finland shared insights to explore these questions.
Lauri Myllyvirta, a senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute and principal analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, highlighted that China’s recent commitment signals a meaningful step forward in its international energy efforts. Chinese manufacturers have dominated global solar equipment supply for years, although most of these projects have involved little Chinese participation in development or financing. This new pledge offers an opportunity for Chinese energy firms to deepen their involvement beyond just supplying equipment, leveraging their expertise in expanding renewable energy abroad.
Currently, China mainly participates in overseas clean energy projects through bidding on initiatives already integrated into host countries’ plans. The new commitment could foster more extensive dialogue with partner governments, promoting energy planning that integrates renewable generation with storage, transmission, and manufacturing. Such an approach would bolster the international influence of Chinese developers and empower partner countries to set more ambitious renewable goals.
Since 2019, China has invested in approximately 10.4 GW of solar and 7.6 GW of wind energy globally. Within SCO nations, investments have been relatively modest—around 1 GW of solar and 0.3 GW of wind—indicating both the current limited scale and substantial potential for expansion in these markets.
In 2024, numerous SCO countries heavily relied on imported solar panels—Pakistan imported 17 GW, India added roughly 28 GW of wind and solar capacity, and Uzbekistan launched about 1.8 GW of solar projects. While these nations’ growing energy needs make a collective target of 10 GW each for solar and wind over five years relatively small, the potential for growth is significant.
However, investing in Russia presents reputational, diplomatic, and ethical risks amid its illegal invasion of Ukraine. Engaging more deeply with other SCO members—many of whom seek to diversify energy sources, enhance security, and reduce emissions—could strengthen China’s leadership in clean energy and align with global climate commitments.
Overall, the 10+10 GW initiative could shift China’s overseas projects from equipment exports and project bidding toward systemic cooperation and strategic energy planning. This shift would support clean energy transitions across SCO countries and reinforce China’s role as a global leader in renewable energy.
Xie Cheng Kai, Associate at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Chatham House, pointed out that the SCO summit introduced new platforms for energy and green industry development and proposed a new development bank. While these are still emerging, more tangible advancements are visible in gas pipeline projects and financial cooperation—part of China’s long-term strategy to diversify and strengthen its position in the global energy market.
The revival of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline exemplifies this effort. Although details like contracts and timelines remain unconfirmed, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) has reportedly been signed, signaling renewed momentum. If realized, this pipeline could supply 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually and increase Russia’s share of China’s gas imports to roughly one-third by the 2030s. Currently, this project is viewed more as a geopolitical move than a commercial certainty, with its success hinging on negotiations between China and Russia.
Unlike oil, where China has sought to avoid dependence on a single supplier, it appears willing to accept some concentration in natural gas supply to maintain flexibility, especially given the U.S. dominance in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Overland Russian gas would provide China a strategic hedge against over-reliance on U.S. LNG and Western financial systems supporting LNG trade.
China’s financial diplomacy is also advancing—Russian energy companies are reportedly allowed to issue renminbi-denominated “panda bonds” in China, which, along with the majority of bilateral trade settled in roubles and renminbi, increases Moscow’s reliance on Chinese financial markets and offers a sanctions-resistant funding avenue for pipelines and LNG operations. This move aligns with China’s strategic aim to promote the international use of the renminbi and reinforce energy security within its financial sovereignty.
Li Yuxiao, based in Beijing and leading projects at Greenpeace East Asia, emphasized that achieving SCO’s wind and solar energy targets will require active collaboration along the entire supply chain—covering manufacturing, financing, and technology transfer. Despite China’s booming domestic capacity, Chinese investors face obstacles such as limited financial mechanisms, risk coverage, and complex regulatory environments when investing abroad.
The 10+10 GW goals involve comprehensive industry participation, including knowledge sharing and technology transfer—elements that seem particularly critical to partner countries’ efforts. Effective cooperation could foster local industry development and accelerate regional energy transition efforts.
Ruchita Shah, an energy analyst at Ember, observed that India’s participation in the SCO reflects an interest in promoting green technology collaboration. While India remains cautious to protect its domestic industry, it is committed to pursuing diversification, technological innovation, and value creation within India—emphasizing technology transfer, finance, and joint research over merely increasing imports.
India’s domestic manufacturing has expanded rapidly, from 2.3 GW of solar panels in 2014 to a projected 100 GW by 2025. Yet, dependence on Chinese solar cells and battery components persists. India’s energy policies aim to balance rising energy demand with security, focusing on renewable expansion, emissions reduction, and climate commitments toward net-zero by 2070. Its leadership in global clean energy governance continues—highlighted by co-founding the International Solar Alliance, which now includes over 120 countries.
Omais Abdur Rehman pointed out that this year’s SCO summit, amid shifting global power dynamics, drew notable attention. Under US tariffs and sanctions, SCO member states began signaling interest in alternative global systems. China, especially, saw the summit as an opportunity to expand its influence—hosting its largest SCO gathering to date with 24 participating leaders and outlining broader regional ambitions. Climate cooperation became a key theme, with China proposing a new SCO development bank and pledging significant grants and loans. Russia emphasized multilateralism, but concrete joint climate actions remain limited, especially amid severe climate disasters facing Pakistan and India.
For Pakistan, the summit may signal an opportunity to pivot toward more sustainable energy strategies, including phased coal retirement and increased collaboration under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The launch of CPEC 2.0 and related business initiatives suggest deeper economic and energy ties, focusing on industrial, agricultural, and digital cooperation.
Despite ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan, climate resilience and environmental cooperation offer a rare avenue for collaboration. The recent floods exposed the critical need for cross-border efforts. However, unresolved tensions and the absence of a joint climate plan at the summit remain obstacles. Still, the SCO provides a platform for dialogue on shared environmental challenges.
